End-to-End IoT Security: Authentication, Vulnerability Exploration and Data Analysis by Arockia Baskaran, Annie Gilda Roselin






Annie Gilda Roselin Arockia Baskaran
School of Electrical and Data Engineering
Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
University of Technology Sydney





A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements





Annie Gilda Roselin Arockia Baskaran
to
School of Electrical and Data Engineering
Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
University of Technology Sydney
NSW - 2007, Australia
February 2020
© 2020 by Annie Gilda Roselin Arockia Baskaran
All Rights Reserved
ABSTRACT
W ireless 6LoWPAN networks consist of resource-starved, small sensor nodes.Secure sensors’ communication is necessary to avoid threats such as a replayattack and a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. This research has three major
parts. The first part of the research focuses on developing a lightweight authentication
algorithm and key management of sensors within the 6LoWPAN network. Before trans-
mitting sensible information, sensors must prove that they are the legal transmitting
entity to the Edge Router. The second part of the research exploits the vulnerability of
CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) on the application layer of the 6LoWPAN proto-
col. We also investigate how 6LoWPAN with CoAP protocol withstands the off-path pin
code injection threat while the 6LoWPAN sensor communicates with the legacy Internet.
The Third part of the research deals with intelligent intrusion detection techniques using
deep learning and clustering algorithms.
The first part, Lightweight Authentication Protocol (LAUP), uses the symmetric key
method with no pre-shared keys. It comprises four flights to establish authentication and
session key distribution between sensors and Edge Router in a 6LoWPAN environment.
Each flight of LAUP uses freshly derived keys from existing information such as PAN ID
(Personal Area Network Identification) and device identities. The second part involves the
CoAP protocol that resides in an application layer protocol of the 6LoWPAN protocol stack.
The widely available CoAP implementations failed to validate the remote CoAP clients.
We exploit the combination of IP Spoofing vulnerability and cross-protocol vulnerability
of CoAP along with the remote server access support to launch the off-path attack. The
off-path attack is considered a weak attack on a constrained network, and it receives
less attention from the research community. However, the consequences resulting from
such an attack cannot be ignored in practice. In the third part, we propose a two-fold
network traffic analysis method for anomaly detection with Optimized Deep Clustering
(ODC), which involves an optimized deep autoencoder and BIRCH clustering algorithm.
We observed that our ODC deep clustering algorithm outperforms the existing deep
clustering methods for anomaly detection.
As a result of this research, we achieve an end-to-end secure communication of
sensors within the 6LoWPAN constrained network and when the 6LoWPAN network
devices interact with the legacy Internet. This research is a concrete contribution to
the IoT Cyber Security community. Also, we ensure the secure communication of IoT by
investigating the network traffic dataset despite any malfunction caused by an intruder.
Dissertation supervised by Professor Dr.Priyadarsi Nanda
School of Electrical and Data Engineering (SEDE)
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